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Abstract
We propose a general framework to allow: (a) specifying the opera-
tional semantics of a programming language; and (b) stating and prov-
ing properties about program correctness. Our framework is based on
a many-sorted system of hybrid modal logic, for which we prove com-
pleteness results. We believe that our approach to program verification
improves over the existing approaches within modal logic as (1) it is based
on operational semantics which allows for a more natural description of
the execution than Hoare’s style weakest precondition used by dynamic
logic; (2) being multi-sorted, it allows for a clearer encoding of semantics,
with a smaller representational distance to its intended meaning.
Keywords: Operational semantics, Program verification, Hybrid modal
logic, Many sorted logic
1 Introduction
Program verification within modal logic, as showcased by dynamic logic [14], is
following the mainstream axiomatic approach proposed by Hoare/Floyd [10, 16].
In this paper, we continue our work from [17] in exploring the amenability of
dynamic logic in particular, and of modal logic in general, to express opera-
tional semantics of languages (as axioms), and to make use of such semantics
in program verification. Consequently, we consider the SMC Machine described
by Plotkin [19], we derive a dynamic logic set of axioms from its proposed tran-
sition semantics, and we argue that this set of axioms can be used to derive
Hoare-like assertions regarding functional correctness of programs written in
the SMC language.
The main idea is to define a general logical system that is powerful enough
to represent both the programs and their semantics in a uniform way. With
respect to this, we follow the line of [13] and the recent work from [20].
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The logical system that we developed as support for our approach is a many-
sorted hybrid polyadic modal logic, built upon our general many-sorted polyadic
modal logic defined in [17]. We chose a modal setting since, as argued above,
through dynamic logic and Hoare logic, modal logic has a long-standing tradition
in program verification (see also [8] for a modal logic approach to separation
logic [21]) and it is successfully used in specifying and verifying hybrid systems
[18].
In [17] we defined a general many-sorted modal logic, generalizing some of
the already existing approaches, e.g. [22, 23] (see [17] for more references on
many-sorted modal logic). This system allows us to specify a language and its
operational semantics and one can use it to certify executions as well. However,
both its expressivity and its capability are limited: we were not able to perform
symbolic execution and, in particular, we were not able to prove Hoare-style
invariant properties for loops. In Remark 2.4, we point out some theoretical
aspects related to these issues.
In the present paper we employ the procedure of hybridization on top of
our many-sorted modal logic previously defined. We drew our inspiration from
[7, 20] for practical aspects, and from the extensive research on hybrid modal
logic [1, 6] on the theoretical side.
Our aim was to develop a system that is strong enough to perform all the
addressed issues (specification, semantics, verification), but also to keep it as
simple as possible from a theoretical point of view. To conclude: in our setting
we are able to associate a sound and complete many-sorted hybrid modal logic to
a given language such that both operational semantics and program verification
can be performed through logical inference.
We have to make a methodological comment: sometimes nominals are pre-
sented as another sort of atoms (see, e.g.[6]). Our sorts come from a many-sorted
signature (S,Σ), as in [13], so all the formulas (in particular the propositional
variables, the state variables, the nominals) are S-sorted sets. When we say
that the hybrid logic is mono-sorted we use sorted according to our context, i.e.
the sets of propositional variables, nominals and state variables are regular sets
and not S-sets.
We recall our many-sorted modal logic [17] in Section 2. The hybridization
is performed in Section 3. A concrete language and its operational semantics
are defined in Section 4; we also show how to perform Hoare-style verification.
A section on related and future work concludes our paper.
2 Preliminaries: a many-sorted modal logic
Our language is determined by a fixed, but arbitrary, many-sorted signature
Σ = (S,Σ) and an S-sorted set of propositional variables P = {Ps}s∈S such
that Ps 6= ∅ for any s ∈ S and Ps1 ∩ Ps2 = ∅ for any s1 6= s2 in S. For any
n ∈ N and s, s1, . . . , sn ∈ S we denote Σs1...sn,s = {σ ∈ Σ | σ : s1 · · · sn → s}.
The set of formulas ofMLΣ is an S-indexed family inductively defined by:
φs ::= p | ¬φs |φs ∨ φs |σ(φs1 , . . . , φsn)
2
where s ∈ S, p ∈ Ps and σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s.
We use the classical definitions of the derived logical connectors: for any
σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s the dual operation is σ
(φ1, . . . , φn) := ¬σ(¬φ1, . . . ,¬φn).
In the sequel, by φs we mean that φ is a formula of sort s ∈ S. Similarly,
Γs means that Γ is a set of formulas of sort s. When the context uniquely
determines the sort of a state symbol, we shall omit the subscript.
In order to define the semantics we introduce the (S,Σ)-frames and the
(S,Σ)-models. An (S,Σ)-frame is a tuple F = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ) such that:
• W = {Ws}s∈S is an S-sorted set of worlds and Ws 6= ∅ for any s ∈ S,
• Rσ ⊆Ws ×Ws1 × . . .×Wsn for any σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s.
An (S,Σ)-model based on F is a pair M = (F , V ) where V = {Vs}s∈S such
that Vs : Ps → P(Ws) for any s ∈ S. The model M = (F , V ) will be simply
denoted as M = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, V ).
In the sequel we introduce a many-sorted satisfaction relation. If M =
(W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, V ) is an (S,Σ)-model, s ∈ S, w ∈ Ws and φ is a formula of sort
s, then the many-sorted satisfaction relation M, w |
s
= φ is inductively defined:
• M, w |
s
= p iff w ∈ Vs(p)
• M, w |
s
= ¬ψ iff M, w 6|
s
= ψ
• M, w |
s
= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff M, w |
s
= ψ1 or M, w |
s
= ψ2
• if σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s, then M, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn) iff there exists (w1, . . . , wn) ∈
Ws1 × · · · ×Wsn such that Rσww1 . . . wn and M, wi |
si= φi for any i ∈ [n].
Definition 2.1 (Validity and satisfiability). Let s ∈ S and assume φ is a
formula of sort s. Then φ is satisfiable if M, w |
s
= φ for some model M and
some w ∈ Ws. The formula φ is valid in a model M if M, w |
s
= φ for any
w ∈ Ws; in this case we write M |
s
= φ. The formula φ is valid in a frame F if
φ is valid in all the models based on F ; in this case we write F |
s
= φ. Finally,
the formula φ is valid if φ is valid in all frames; in this case we write |
s
= φ.
The set of theorems of KΣ is the least set of formulas that contains all the
axioms and it is closed under deduction rules. Note that the set of theorems
is obviously closed under S-sorted uniform substitution (i.e. propositional vari-
ables of sort s are uniformly replaced by formulas of the same sort). If φ is a
theorem of sort s write | s
KΣ
φ. Obviously, KΣ is a generalization of the modal
system K (see [6] for the mono-sorted version).
The distinction between local and global deduction from the mono-sorted
setting (see [6]) is deepened in our version: locally, the conclusion and the
hypotheses have the same sort, while globally, the set of hypotheses is a many-
sorted set. In the sequel we only consider the local setting.
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The system KΣ
• For any s ∈ S, if α is a formula of sort s which is a theorem in propositional
logic, then α is an axiom.
• Axiom schemes: for any σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s and for any formulas φ1, . . . , φn, φ, χ of
appropriate sorts, the following formulas are axioms:
(Kσ) σ
(. . . , φi−1, φ→ χ, φi+1, . . .)→
(σ(. . . , φi−1, φ, φi+1, . . .)→ σ
(. . . , φi−1, χ, φi+1, . . .))
(Dualσ) σ(ψ1, . . . , ψn)↔ ¬σ
(¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn)
• Deduction rules: Modus Ponens and Universal Generalization
(MP ) if | s φ and | s φ→ ψ then | s ψ
(UG) if |si φ then | s σ(φ1, .., φ, ..φn)
Figure 1: (S,Σ) modal logic
Definition 2.2 (Local deduction). [17] If s ∈ S and Γs ∪ {φ} is a set of
formulas of sort s, then we say that φ is (locally) provable from Γs if there
are γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Γs such that |
s
KΣ
(γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn)→ φ. In this case we write
Γs |
s
KΣ
φ.
The construction of the canonical model is a straightforward generalization
of the mono-sorted setting. For more details, we refer to [17]. The last result
we recall is the (strong) completeness theorem with respect to the class of all
frames.
Theorem 2.3. [17] Let Γs be a set of formulas of set s. If Γs is a consistent
set in KΣ then Γs has a model. Moreover, if φ is a formula of sort s, then
Γs |=KΣ φ iff Γs ⊢KΣ φ, where Γs |=KΣ φ denotes the fact that any model of Γ
is also a model of φ.
Remark 2.4 (Problems). The many-sorted modal logic allows us to define both
the syntax and the semantics of a programming language (see [17] for a complex
example). However, there are few issues, both theoretical and operational, that
we could not overcome:
(i1) the logic can be used to certify executions, but not to perform symbolic
verification; in particular, in order to prove the invariant properties for
loops, the existential binder is required;
(i2) the completeness theorem for extensions of KΣ from [17] only refers to
model completeness, but says nothing about frame completeness (see [11]
for a general discussion on this distinction);
(i3) the sorts are completely isolated formally, but in our example elements of
different sorts have a rich interaction.
These issues will be adressed in the following sections.
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3 Many-sorted hybrid modal logic
The hybridization of our many-sorted modal logic is developed using a combi-
nation of ideas and techniques from [1, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12]. Hybrid logic is defined on
top of modal logic by adding nominals, states variables and specific operators
and binders.
Nominals allow us to directly refer the worlds (states) of a model, since they
are evaluated in singletons in any model. However, a nominal may refer different
worlds in different models. In the sequel we introduce the constant nominals,
which are evaluated to singletons, but they refer to the same world (state) in all
models. Our example for constant nominals are true and false from Section
4.
Definition 3.1 (Signature with constant nominals). A signature with constant
nominals is a triple (S,Σ, N) where (S,Σ) is a many-sorted signature and N =
(Ns)s∈S is an S-sorted set of constant nominal symbols. In the sequel, we denote
Σ = (S,Σ, N).
As before, the sorts will be denoted by s, t, . . . and by PROP = {PROPs}s∈S ,
NOM = {NOMs}s∈S and SVAR = {SVARs}s∈S we will denote some countable
S-sorted sets. The elements of PROP are ordinary propositional variables and
they will be denoted p, q,. . .; the elements of NOM are called nominals and they
will be denoted by j, k, . . .; the elements of SVAR are called state variables and
they are denoted x, y, . . .. We shall assume that for any distinct sorts s 6= t ∈ S,
the corresponding sets of propositional variables, nominals and state variables
are distinct. A state symbol is a nominal, a constant nominal or a state variable..
As in the mono-sorted case, nominals and state variables will be semantically
constrained: they are evaluated in singleton, which means they will always refer
to a unique world of our model. In addition, the constant nominals will refer to
the same world(state) in any evaluation, so they will be defined at the frames’
level.
In the mono-sorted setting, starting with a modal logic, the simplest hybrid
system is obtained by adding nominals alone. However, the basic hybrid system
is obtained by adding the satisfaction modality @jφ (which states that φ is true
at the world denoted by the nominal j). The most powerful hybrid systems
are obtained by further adding the binders ∀ and ∃ that bind state variables to
worlds, with the expected semantics [1, 2, 4]. The subsequently defined systems
HΣ(@) andHΣ(@, ∀) develop the hybrid modal logic in our many-sorted setting.
Note that, whenever the context is clear, we’ll simply write |
s
= instead of
|
s
=HΣ(@) or |
s
=HΣ(@,∀), and |
s instead of | s
HΣ(@)
or | s
HΣ(@,∀)
. We will
further assume that the sort of a formula (set of formulas) is implied by a
concrete context but, whenever necessary, we will use subscripts to fix the sort
of a symbol: xs means that x is a state variable of sort s, Γs means that Γ is a
set of formulas of sort s, etc.
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Definition 3.2 (Formulas). For any s ∈ S we define the formulas of sort s:
- for HΣ(@): φs := p | j | ¬φs | φs ∨ φs | σ(φs1 , . . . , φsn)s | @
s
kφt
- for HΣ(@, ∀): φs := p | j | ys | ¬φs | φs ∨ φs | σ(φs1 , . . . , φsn)s | @
s
kφt | ∀xt φs
Here, p ∈ PROPs, j ∈ NOMs ∪ Ns, t ∈ S, k ∈ NOMt ∪ Nt,x ∈ SVARt, y ∈
SVARs and σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s. For any σ ∈ Σs1...s,s, the dual formula σ
(φ1, . . . , φn)
is defined as in Section 2. We also define the dual binder ∃: for any s, t ∈ S, if φ
is a formula of sort s and x is a state variable of sort t, then ∃xφ := ¬∀x¬φ is
a formula of sort s. The notions of free state variables and bound state variables
are defined as usual.
Remark 3.3 (Expressivity). As a departure from our sources of inspiration,
we only defined the satisfaction operators @j for nominals, and not for state
variables. Hence, @x is not a valid formula in our logic. Our reason was to
keep the system as ”simple” as possible, but strong enough to overcome the
problems encountered in the non-hybrid setting (see Remarks 2.4). More issues
concerning expressivity are analyzed in Section 5.
One important remark is the definition of the satisfaction modalities: if k
and φ are a nominal and respectively, a formula of the sort t ∈ S, then we define
a family of satisfaction operators {@skφ}s∈S such that @
s
kφ is a formula of sort s
for any s ∈ S. This means that φ is true at the world denoted by k on the sort
t and is acknowledged on any sort s ∈ S. So, our sorted worlds are not isolated
anymore, both from a syntactic and a semantic point of view.
Definition 3.4. If Σ = (S,Σ, N) then a Σ-frame is F = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, NF )
where (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ) is an (S,Σ)-frame and N
F = (NFs )s∈S and N
F
s = (w
c)c∈Ns
⊆ Ws for any s ∈ S. We will further assume that distinct constant nominals
have distinct sorts, so we shall simply write NF = (wc)c∈N .
Definition 3.5 (The satisfaction relation in HΣ(@)). A (hybrid) model in
HΣ(@) is a triple
M = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (wc)c∈N , V )
where V : PROP ∪ NOM → P(W ) is an S-sorted valuation such that Vs(k) is
a singleton for any s ∈ S and k ∈ NOMs. If V is an S-sorted evaluation, we
define V N : PROP∪NOM∪N → P(W ) by V Ns (c) = {w
c} for any s ∈ S, c ∈ Ns
and V Ns (v) = Vs(v) otherwise.
The satisfaction relation for nominals, constant nominals and satisfaction
operators is defined as follows:
• M, w |
t
= k if and only if V Nt (k) = {w},
• M, w′ |
s
= @skφ if and only if M, w |
t
= φ where V Nt (k) = {w}.
Here s, t ∈ S, w ∈ Wt, w′ ∈ Ws, k ∈ NOMt ∪ Nt and φ is a formula of sort t.
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Satisfiability and validity in H(@) are defined as in Section 2.
In order to define the semantics for HΣ(@, ∀) more is needed. Given a model
M = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (wc)c∈N , V ), an assignment is an S-sorted map g : SVAR→
W . If g and g′ are assignment functions s ∈ S and x ∈ SV ARs then we say
that g′ is an x-variant of g (and we write g′
x
∼ g) if gt = g′t for t 6= s ∈ S and
gs(y) = g
′
s(y) for any y ∈ SV ARs, y 6= x.
Definition 3.6 (The satisfaction relation in HΣ(@, ∀)). In the sequel
M = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (wc)c∈N , V )
is a model and g : SVAR → W an S-sorted assignment. The satisfaction
relation is defined as follows:
• M, g, w |
s
= a, if and only if w ∈ V Ns (a), where a ∈ PROPs ∪NOMs ∪Ns,
• M, g, w |
s
= x, if and only if w = gs(x), where x ∈ SVARs,
• M, g, w |
s
= ¬φ, if and only if M, g, w 6|
s
= φ
• M, g, w |
s
= φ ∨ ψ, if and only if M, g, w |
s
= φ or M, g, w |
s
= ψ
• if σ ∈ Σs1...sn,S then M, g, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn), if and only if there is
(w1, . . . , wn) ∈Ws1×· · ·×Wsn such that Rσww1 . . . wn andM, g, wi |
si= φi
for any i ∈ [n],
• M, g, w |
s
= @skφ if and only if M, g, u |
t
= φ where k ∈ NOMt ∪Nt, φ has
the sort t and V Nt (k) = {u},
• M, g, w |
s
= ∀xφ, if and only if M, g′, w |
s
= φ for all g′
x
∼ g.
Consequently,
• M, g, w |
s
= ∃xφ, if and only if ∃g′(g′
x
∼ g and M, g′, w |
s
= φ).
Following the mono-sorted setting, satisfiability in H(@, ∀) is defined as fol-
lows: a formula φ of sort s ∈ S is satisfiable if M, g, w |
s
= φ for some model M,
some assignment g and some w ∈ Ws. Consequently, the formula φ is valid in a
modelM if M, g, w |
s
= φ for any assignment g and any w ∈ Ws. One can speak
about validity in a frame as in Section 2.
In the presence of nominals, we can speak about named models and pure
formulas, as in [6][Section 7.3].
Definition 3.7 (Named models and pure formulas). A formula is pure if it does
not contain propositional variables. A pure instance of a formula is obtained by
is obtained by uniformly substituting nominals for nominals of the same sort. A
model M = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (w
c)c∈NV ) is named if for any sort s ∈ S and world
w ∈ Ws there exists k ∈ NOMs ∪ Ns such that w = V Ns (k).
As in the mono-sorted case, pure formulas and named models are important
since they give rise to strong completeness results with respect to the class of
frames they define.
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Proposition 3.8 (Pure formulas inHΣ(@)). LetM = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (wc)c∈N , V )
be a named model, F = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (wc)c∈N) the corresponding frame and φ
a pure formula of sort s. Then F |
s
= φ if and only if M |
s
= ψ for any ψ that is
a pure instance of φ.
Proof. Let φ be a pure formula of sort s and suppose F 6|
s
= φ. Then there exist
a valuation V ′ and some state w ∈ Ws in the model M′ = (F , V ′) such that
M′, w 6|
s
= φ.
On each sort s ∈ S we will notate js1 , . . . , j
s
t all the nominals occurring in
φ. But because we are working in a named model, V labels every state of any
sort in F with a nominal of the same sort. Hence, on each sort s ∈ S there
exist ks1, . . . , k
s
t nominals such that V
N
s (j
s
1) = V
′
s (k
s
1), . . . ,V
N
s (j
s
t ) = V
′
s (k
s
t ).
Therefore, if M′, w 6|
s
= φ and ψ is obtained by substituting on each sort each
nominal jsi with the corresponding one k
s
i , then M, w 6|
s
= ψ.
But φ is a pure formula, and by substituting the nominals contained in the
formula with other nominals of the same sort, the new instance it is also a pure
formulas like ψ. Therefore, by hypothesis, we have M, v |
s
= ψ for any v ∈ Ws.
But also w ∈Ws, hence M, w |
s
= ψ, and we have a contradiction.
Can we prove a similar result for the system HΣ(@, ∀)? We give a positive
answer to this question, inspired by the discussion on existential saturation rules
from [3][Lemma 1]. In order to do this, we define the ∀∃-pure formulas and we
characterize frame satisfiability for such formulas. As consequence, Propositions
3.8 and 3.11 will lead to completeness results with respect to frame validity.
Definition 3.9. In HΣ(@, ∀), we say that a formula is ∀∃-pure if it is pure
or it has the form ∀x1 . . .∀xn∃y1 . . . ∃ymψ, where ψ contains no propositional
variables and the only state symbols from ψ are in {x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym}.
Proposition 3.10 (Pure formulas in HΣ(@, ∀)). Let M be a named model
where M = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (wc)c∈N , V ), F = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (wc)c∈N) the corre-
sponding frame and φ a ∀∃-pure formula of sort s. Then F |
s
= φ if and only if
M |
s
= φ.
Proposition 3.11 (Pure formulas in HΣ(@, ∀)). Let M be a named model
where M = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (wc)c∈N , V ), F = (W, (Rσ)σ∈Σ, (wc)c∈N) the corre-
sponding frame and φ a ∀∃-pure formula of sort s. Then F |
s
= φ if and only if
M |
s
= φ.
Proof. Suppose M |
s
= ∀x1 . . . ∀xn∃y1 . . .∃ynφ where y1, . . . , yn do not occur in
φ. Hence, for any g and any w of sort s, M, g, w |
s
= ∀x1 . . . ∀xn∃y1 . . . ∃ynφ
where y1, . . . , yn do not occur in φ. So, for any assignment g
′ x1,...,xn∼ g ex-
ists an assignment g′′
y1,...,yn
∼ g′ such that M, g′′, w |
s
= φ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn).
Let g′(xi) = {wi} and g′′(yi) = {w′i} for any i ∈ [n]. Because we work with
named model, there exist nominals ki and ji such that V
N
s (ki) = {wi} and
V Ns (ji) = {w
′
i} for any i ∈ [n]. Therefore, we get for any k1, . . . , kn exist
j1, . . . , jn such that M, g′′, w |
s
= φ[k1/x1, . . . , kn/xn, j1/y1, . . . , jn/yn]. But now
8
we have a pure formula and the assignment function will not affect the sat-
isfiability of the formula. Therefore, for any k1, . . . , kn exist j1, . . . , jn such
that F |
s
= φ[k1/x1, . . . , kn/xn, j1/y1, . . . , jn/yn]. Therefore, for any assignment
g and any w of sort s we have that for any k1, . . . , kn there exist j1, . . . , jn such
that M′, g, w |
s
= φ[k1/x1, . . . , kn/xn, j1/y1, . . . , jn/yn]. We use the contraposi-
tive of (Q2) axiom to get that M′, g, w |
s
= ∃y1 . . . ∃ynφ[k1/x1, . . . , kn/xn] and
by Lemma 3.14 we get that for any assignment g and any w of sort s we have that
M′, g, w |
s
= ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn∃y1 . . .∃ynφ if and only if F |
s
= ∀x1, . . . , ∀xn∃y1 . . . ∃ynφ.
We are ready now to define the deductive systems of our logics. The deduc-
tive systems for HΣ(@) and HΣ(@, ∀) are presented in Figure 2.
In the sequel, our main focus is on the more expressive system H(@, ∀). The
properties and the proofs for H(@) follow easily from their equivalent in the
richer setting.
Theorems and (local) deduction from hypothesis are defined as in Section
2. In order to further develop our framework, we need to analyze the uniform
substitutions. Apart for being S-sorted, in the hybrid setting, more restrictions
are required: state variables are uniformly replaced by state symbols that are
substitutable for them (as in the mono-sorted setting [4]). Nominals and constant
nominals are always substitutable for state variables of the same sort. If x and
z are state variables of the sort s, then we define:
• if φ ∈ PROPs ∪ SVARs ∪ NOMs ∪Ns, then z is substitutable for x in φ,
• z is substitutable for x in ¬φ iff z is substitutable for x in φ,
• z is substitutable for x in φ ∨ ψ iff z is substitutable for x in φ and ψ,
• z is substitutable for x in σ(φ1, . . . , φn) iff z is substitutable for x in φi
for all i ∈ [n],
• z is substitutable for x in @sjφ iff z is substitutable for x in φ,
• z is substitutable for x in ∀y φ iff x does not occur free in φ, or y 6= z and
z is substitutable for x in φ.
In the sequel, we will say that a substitution is legal if it perform only allowed
replacements. If φ is a formula and x is a state variable we denote by φ[z/x]
the formula obtained by substituting z for all free occurrences of x in φ (z must
be a nominal, a constant nominal or a state variable substitutable for x).
Lemma 3.12 (Agreement Lemma). Let M be a standard model. For all stan-
dard M-assignments g and h, all states w in M and all formulas φ of sort
s ∈ S, if g and h agree on all state variables occurring freely in φ, then:
M, g, w |
s
= φ iff M, h, w |
s
= φ
Proof. We suppose that g and h agree on all state variables occurring freely in
φ on each sort. We prove this lemma by induction on the complexity of φ:
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The system HΣ(@, ∀)
• The axioms and the deduction rules of KΣ
• Axiom schemes: any formula of the following form is an axiom, where
s, s′, t are sorts, σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s, φ, ψ, φ1, . . . , φn are formulas (when neces-
sary, their sort is marked as a subscript), j, k are nominals or constant
nominals, and x, y are state variables:
(K@) @sj(φt → ψt)→ (@
s
jφ→ @
s
jψ) (Agree) @
t
k@
t′
j φs ↔ @
t
jφs
(SelfDual) @sjφt ↔ ¬@
s
j¬φt (Intro) j → (φs ↔ @
s
jφs)
(Back) σ(. . . , φi−1,@
si
j ψt, φi+1, . . .)s → @
s
jψt (Ref) @
s
jjt
(Q1) ∀x (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ∀xψ) where φ contains no free occurrences of x
(Q2) ∀xφ→ φ[y/x] where y is substitutable for x in φ
(Name) ∃xx
(Barcan) ∀xσ(φ1, . . . , φn)→ σ
(φ1, . . . , ∀xφi, . . . , φn)
(Barcan@) ∀x@jφ→ @j∀xφ
(Nomx) @kx ∧@jx→ @kj
• Deduction rules:
(BroadcastS) if | s @sjφt then |
s′ @s
′
j φt
(Gen@) if |s
′
φ then | s @jφ, where j and φ have the same sort s′
(Name@) if | s @jφ then |
s′ φ, where j does not occur in φ
(Paste) if | s @jσ(. . . , k, . . .) ∧@kφ→ ψ then |
s @jσ(. . . , φ, . . .)→ ψ
where k is distinct from j that does not occur in φ or ψ
(Gen) if | s φ then | s ∀xφ
where φ ∈ Forms and x ∈ SV ARt for some t ∈ S.
Here, j and k are nominals or constant nominals having the appropriate
sort.
The system HΣ(@)
• The axioms and the deduction rules of KΣ
• Axiom schemes: (K@), (SelfDual), (Back), (Agree), (Intro), (Ref)
• Deduction rules: (BroadcastS), (Gen@), (Subst), (Name@), (Paste)
Figure 2: (S,Σ) hybrid logic
• M, g, w |
s
= a iff a ∈ PROPs∪NOMs∪Ns we have w ∈ V Ns (a) iffM, h, w |
s
=
a.
• M, g, w |
s
= x iff x ∈ SVARs we have w = gs(x), but gs(x) = hs(x),
therefore M, h, w |
s
= x.
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• M, g, w |
s
= ¬φ iffM, g, w 6|
s
= φ. But, if g and h agree on all state variables
occurring freely in ¬φ, then same for φ. Therefore, from the induction
hypothesis,M, g, w |
s
= φ iffM, h, w |
s
= φ. ThenM, g, w 6|
s
= φ iffM, h, w 6|
s
=
φ. Then M, h, w |
s
= ¬φ.
• M, g, w |
s
= φ∨ψ, iffM, g, w |
s
= φ orM, g, w |
s
= ψ. But, g and h agree on all
state variables occurring freely in φ or ψ, then from induction hypothesis,
we have (M, g, w |
s
= φ iff M, h, w |
s
= φ) or (M, g, w |
s
= ψ iff M, h, w |
s
= ψ).
Then, (M, h, w |
s
= ψ or M, h, w |
s
= ψ) iff M, h, w |
s
= φ ∨ ψ.
• M, g, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn) iff there is (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Ws1 × · · · ×Wsn such
that Rσww1 . . . wn and M, g, wi |
si= φi for each i ∈ [n], then, by induction
hypothesis M, h, wi |
si= φi for each i ∈ [n]. Hence, we have that there is
(w1, . . . , wn) ∈Ws1×· · ·×Wsn such that Rσww1 . . . wn andM, h, wi |
si= φi
for each i ∈ [n] iff M, h, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn).
• M, g, w |
s
= @sjφ iff M, g, v |
s′
= φ where V Ns′ (j) = {v} iff M, h, v |
s′
= φ where
V Ns′ (j) = {v} (induction hypothesis) iff M, h, w |
s
= @sjφ.
• M, g, w |
s
= ∀xφ iff ∀g′(g′
x
∼ g implies M, g′, w |
s
= φ). But g and h agree
on all state variables occurring freely in ∀xφ and because x is bounded,
then hs(y) = gs(y) for any y 6= x. Therefore, ∀g′(g′s(y) = gs(y) = hs(y)
for any y 6= x implies M, g′, w |
s
= φ) equivalent with ∀g′(g′
x
∼ h implies
M, h′, w |
s
= φ) iff M, h, w |
s
= ∀xφ. 
Lemma 3.13 (Substitution Lemma). Let M be a standard model. For all
standard M-assignments g, all states w in M and all formulas φ, if y is a state
variable that is substitutable for x in φ and j is a nominal then:
• M, g, w |
s
= φ[y/x] iff M, g′, w |
s
= φ where g′
x
∼ g and g′s(x) = gs(y)
• M, g, w |
s
= φ[j/x] iff M, g′, w |
s
= φ where g′
x
∼ g and g′s(x) = V
N
s (j)
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ.
• φ = a, a ∈ PROPs ∪NOMs ∪Ns. Then a[y/x] = a and M, g, w |
s
= a[y/x]
if and only if M, g, w |
s
= a if and only if w ∈ V Ns (a). But g
′ x∼ g and by
Agreement Lemma M, g′, w |
s
= a.
• φ = z, where z ∈ SVARs. We have two cases:
1. If z 6= x, then M, g, w |
s
= z[y/x] if and only if M, g, w |
s
= z if and
only if M, g′, w |
s
= z (Agreement Lemma).
2. If z = x, then M, g, w |
s
= z[y/x] if and only if M, g, w |
s
= y if and
only if w ∈ gs(y) if and only if w ∈ g′s(x) if and only if w ∈ g
′
s(z) if
and only if M, g′, w |
s
= z.
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• φ = ¬φ, then M, g, w |
s
= ¬φ if and only if M, g, w 6|
s
= φ if and only if
M, g′, w 6|
s
= φ (inductive hypothesis) if and only if M, g′, w |
s
= ¬φ.
• φ = φ∨ψ, then M, g, w |
s
= (φ∨ψ)[y/x] if and only if M, g, w |
s
= φ[y/x] or
M, g, w |
s
= ψ[y/x] if and only if M, g′, w |
s
= φ or M, g′, w |
s
= ψ (inductive
hypothesis) if and only if M, g′, w |
s
= φ ∨ ψ.
• φ = σ(φ1, . . . , φn), then M, g, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn)[y/x] if and only if
M, g, w |
s
= σ(φ1[y/x], . . . , φn[y/x]) if and only if exists (u1, . . . , un) ∈
Ws1 × . . . ×Wsn such that Rσwu1 . . . un and M, g, ui |
si= φi[y/x] for any
i ∈ [n] if and only if there exists (u1, . . . , un) ∈Ws1 × . . .×Wsn such that
Rσwu1 . . . un and M, g′, ui |
si= φi for any i ∈ [n] (inductive hypothesis) if
and only if M, g′, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn).
• φ = @sjφ, then M, g, w |
s
= @sjφ[y/x] if and only if M, g, v |
s
= φ[y/x] where
V Ns′ = {v} if and only if M, g
′, v |
s′
= φ where V Ns′ = {v} (inductive hypoth-
esis) if and only if M, g′, w |
s
= @sjφ.
• φ = ∀xφ, then M, g, w |
s
= (∀xφ)[y/z] if and only if M, g, w |
s
= (∀xφ)[y/z]
if and only if M, g, w |
s
= ∀xφ if and only if M, g′, w |
s
= ∀xφ (Agreement
Lemma).
For the next case we will use the notation gx←y to specify that x is sub-
stituted by y, therefore, if x if free in a formula, after substitution we will
not have any more x.
Claim 1. The following two statements are equivalent:
– For all g′, if g′
z
∼ g then M, g′x←y, w |
s
= φ.
– For all g′, if g′
z
∼ gx←y then M, g′, w |
s
= φ.
Proof. Suppose for all g′, if g′
z
∼ g then M, g′x←y, w |
s
= φ and g′
z
∼ gx←y.
Since g′s(o) = g
x←y
s (o) for any o 6= z and x 6= z, then g
′
s(x) = g
x←y
s (x) =
gs(y). Therefore, g
′
s = g
′
s
x←y
and g′ = g′
x←y
. Hence, M, g′, w |
s
= φ.
Next, suppose for all g′, if g′
z
∼ gx←y then M, g′, w |
s
= φ and g′
z
∼ g.
Therefore, g′x←ys
z
∼ gx←ys , so g
′x←y z∼ gx←y. From second case, we have
that M, g′x←y, w |
s
= φ.
• φ = ∀zφ, where z 6= x. Suppose M, g, w |
s
= (∀zφ)[y/x] iff M, g, w |
s
=
∀z(φ[y/x]) iff for all g′, if g′
z
∼ g then M, g′, w |
s
= φ[y/x] iff for all g′,
if g′
z
∼ g then M, g′x←y, w |
s
= φ (induction hypothesis) iff or all g′, if
g′
z
∼ gx←y then M, g′, w |
s
= φ (Claim 1) iff M, gx←y, w |
s
= ∀zφ where
g′s(x) = g(y) and g
′ z∼ g iff M, g′, w |
s
= ∀zφ where g′s(x) = gs(y) and
g′
z
∼ g (Agreement Lemma).
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Lemma 3.14 (Generalization on nominals). Assume | s φ[i/x] where i ∈ NOMt
and x ∈ SVARt for some t ∈ S. Then there is a state variable y ∈ SVARt that
does not appear in φ such that | s φ[y/x]
Proof. There are two cases. First, let us suppose that x does not occur free
in φ, therefore φ[j/x] is identical to φ[y/x], hence as φ[j/x] is provable, so is
∀yφ[y/x] for any choice of y.
Secondly, suppose that x occur free in φ. Suppose φ[j/x]. Hence we have a
proof of φ[j/x] and we choose any variable y that does not occur in the proof,
or in φ. We replace every occurrence of j in the proof of φ[j/x] with y. It
follows by induction on the length of proofs that this new sequence is a proof
of φ[y/x]. By generalization we extend the proof with ∀y(φ[y/x]) and we can
conclude that ∀y(φ[y/x]) is provable.
The systems HΣ(@) and HΣ(@, ∀) are sound with respect to the intended
semantics.
Proposition 3.15 (Soundness). The deductive systems for HΣ(@) and HΣ(@, ∀)
from Figure 2 are sound.
Proof. We will only prove the soundness of the more complex system H(@, ∀),
since this proof is similar for the HΣ(@) system.
Let M be an arbitrary model and w any state of sort s.
(K@) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= @sj(φt → ψt) if and only if M, g, v |
t
= φt → ψt
where V Nt (j) = {v} iff M, g, v |
t
= φt implies M, g, v |
t
= ψt where V
N
t (j) = {v}.
SupposeM, g, w |
s
= @sjφt and V
N
t (j) = {v}. ThenM, g, v |
t
= φt where V
N
t (j) =
{v} , but this implies thatM, g, v |
t
= ψt where V
N
t (j) = {v} iffM, g, w |
s
= @sjψt.
(Agree) SupposeM, g, w |
t′
= @t
′
k@
t
jφs iffM, g, v |
t
= @tjφs where V
N
t (k) = {v}
iff M, g, u |
s
= φs where V
N
t (k) = {v} and V
N
s (j) = {u}. Then M, g, u |
s
= φs
where V Ns (j) = {u} which implies that M, g, w |
t′
= @t
′
j φs.
(SelfDual) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= ¬@sj¬φt iff M, g, w 6|
s
= @sj¬φt iff M, g, v 6|
t
=
¬φt where V Nt (j) = {v} iffM, g, v |
t
= φt where V
N
t (j) = {v} iffM, g, w |
s
= @sjφt.
(Back) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= σ(. . . , φi−1,@
si
j ψt, φi+1, . . .)s if and only if there
is (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Ws1 × · · · ×Wsn such that Rσww1 . . . wn and M, g, wi |
si= φi
for any i ∈ [n]. This implies that there is wi ∈ Wsi such thatM, g, wi |
si= @sij ψt,
then M, g, v |
t
= ψt where V
N
t (j) = {v}. Hence, M, g, w |
s
= @sjψt
(Ref) Suppose M, g, w 6|
s
= @sjjt. Then M, g, v 6|
t
= j where V Nt (j) = {v},
contradiction.
(Intro) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= j and M, g, w |
s
= φs. Then V
N
s (j) = {w} and
M, g, w |
s
= φs implies that M, g, w |
s
= @sjφs. Now, suppose M, g, w |
s
= j and
M, g, w |
s
= @sjφs. Because, from the first assumption, we have V
N
s (j) = {w},
then, form the second one, we can conclude that M, g, w |
s
= φs.
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(Q1) Suppose thatM, g, w |
s
= ∀x(φ→ ψ) iffM, g′, w |
s
= φ→ ψ for all g′
x
∼ g.
Results that for all g′
x
∼ g we have M, g′, w |
s
= φ implies M, g′, w |
s
= ψ. But
φ contains no free occurrences of x, then for all g′
x
∼ g we have (M, g, w |
s
=
φ implies M, g′, w |
s
= ψ). Hence, M, g, w |
s
= φ implies that, for all g′
x
∼ g,
M, g′, w |
s
= ψ. Then, M, g, w |
s
= φ implies that M, g, w |
s
= ∀ψ iff M, g, w |
s
=
φ→ ∀xψ .
(Q2) Suppose that M, g, w |
s
= ∀xφ. We need to prove that M, g′, w |
s
=
φ[y/x]. But this is equivalent, by Substitution Lemma, with proving that
M, g′, w |
s
= φ where g′
x
∼ g and g′s(x) = gs(y). But M, g, w |
s
= ∀xφ iff
M, g′, w |
s
= φ for all g′
x
∼ g. Let g′s(z) = g(y), if z = x, and g
′
s(z) = g(z),
otherwise. Therefore, we have g′
x
∼ g , g′s(x) = gs(y) and M, g
′, w |
s
= φ. For
the case of substituting with a nominal is similar. We define g′s(x) = V
N
s (j), if
z = x, and g′s(z) = g(z), otherwise.
(Name) Suppose thatM, g, w |
s
= ∃xx iff exists g′
x
∼ g andM, g′, w |
s
= x. We
choose g′ an x-variant of g such that g′s(x) = {w}.
(Barcan) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= ∀xσ(φ1, . . . , φn) then for all g′
x
∼ g, and
for all wi ∈ Wsi , i ∈ [n], Rσww1 . . . wn implies M, g
′, wi |
si= φi for all i ∈ [n].
But g and g′ agree on all state variables occurring freely. Therefore, for all
wi ∈ Wsi , i ∈ [n], Rσww1 . . . wn and all g
′ x∼ g , we have M, g, wi |
si= φi for all
i ∈ [n] and i 6= l and M, g′, wl |
sl= φl. Hence, for the l-th argument, we have
M, g, wl |
sl= ∀xφl. So, M, g, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , ∀xφl . . . φn).
(Barcan@) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= ∀x@sjφ iff M, g
′, w |
s
= @sjφ for all g
′ x∼ g.
Then, M, g′, v |
t
= φ for all g′
x
∼ g where V Nt (j) = {v} and so M, g, v |
t
= ∀xφ
where V Nt (j) = {v}. Hence, M, g, w |
s
= @sj∀xφ.
(Nom x) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= @sjx and M, g, w |
s
= @skx. Then M, g, v |
t
= x
where V Nt (j) = {v} and M, g, u |
t
= x where V Nt (k) = {u}. This implies that
u = v, so V Nt (j) = V
N
t (k). Then M, g, w |
s
= @sjk for any model M and any
world w.
(BroadcastS) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= @sjφt if and only if M, g, v |
t
= φt where
V Nt (j) = {v}. Hence, for any s
′ ∈ S we have M, g, w |
s′
= @s
′
j φt.
Now, let M be an arbitrary named model.
(Name@) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= @sjφ iff M, g, v |
s′
= φ where V Ns′ (j) = {v}, but
we work in named models, therefore, in any modelM there exist v and j where
V Ns′ (j) = {v} and this implies M, g, v |
s′
= φ.
(Paste) Suppose M, g, w |
s
= @sjσ(ψ1, . . . , ψi−1, k, ψi+1, . . . , ψn) ∧@
s
kφ→ ψ
iff M, g, w |
s
= @sjσ(ψ1, . . . , ψi−1, k, ψi+1, . . . , ψn) and M, g, w |
s
= @skφ implies
M, g, w |
s
= ψ. Hence,M, g, v |
s′
= σ(ψ1, . . . , ψi−1, k, ψi+1, . . . , ψn) where V
N
s′ (j) =
{v} iff exists (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ (Ws1 × . . .×Wsn) such that Rσvv1 . . . vi . . . vn where
V Ns′ (j) = {v} and M, g, ve |
s′
= ψe for any e ∈ [n], e 6= i and M, g, vi |
si= k iff
V Nsi (k) = {vi}. If M, g, w |
s
= @sk and V
N
si
(k) = {vi}, then M, g, vi |
si= φ.
Then, if there exists (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ (Ws1×. . .×Wsn) such thatRσvv1 . . . vi . . . vn
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where V Ns′ (j) = {v} and M, g, ve |
s′
= ψe for any e ∈ [n], e 6= i and M, g, vi |
si= φ,
these imply M, g, w |
s
= ψ. So, M, g, v |
s′
= σ(ψ1, . . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . . , ψn) where
V Ns′ (j) = {v} implies M, g, w |
s
= ψ.
In conclusion, M, g, w |
s′
= @sjσ(ψ1, . . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . . , ψn)→ ψ.
Lemma 3.16. 1. The following formulas are theorems:
(Nom) @skj → (@
s
kφ↔ @
s
jφ)
for any t ∈ S, k, j ∈ NOMt ∪Nt and φ a formula of sort t.
(Sym) @skj → @
s
jk
where s ∈ S and j, k ∈ NOMt ∪Nt for some t ∈ S,
(Bridge) σ(. . . φi1 , j, φi+1 . . .) ∧@
s
jφ→ σ(. . . φi−1, φ, φi+1, . . .)
if σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s, j ∈ NOMsi ∪Nsi and φ is a formula of sort si.
2. if | s φ→ j then | t σ(. . . , φ, . . .)→ σ(. . . , j, . . .) ∧@tjφ
for any s, t ∈ S, σ ∈ Σt1···tn,t, j ∈ NOMs ∪Ns and φ a formula of sort s.
Proof. In the sequel, by PL we mean classical propositional logic and by ML we
mean the basic modal logic.
1. (Nom)
(1) | t j → (φ↔ @tjφ) (Intro)
(2) | s @sk(j → (φ↔ @
t
jφ)) (Gen@)
(3) | s @sk(j → (φ↔ @
t
jφ))→ (@
s
kj → @
s
k(φ↔ @
t
jφ)) (K@)
(4) | s @skj → @
s
k(φ↔ @
t
jφ) (MP ) : (2), (3)
(5) | s @sk(φ↔ @
t
jφ)↔ (@
s
kφ↔ @
s
k@
t
jφ) ML
(6) | s @skj → (@
s
kφ↔ @
s
k@
t
jφ) PL:(4), (5)
(7) | s @sk@
t
jφ↔ @
s
jφ (Agree)
(8) | s @skj → (@
s
kφ↔ @
s
jφ) PL:(6), (7)
(Sym)
(1) | s @skj ∧@
s
jk→ @
s
jk Taut
(2) | s @skj ∧@
s
jk→ @
s
jk)→ (@
s
kj → (@
s
jk → @
s
jk)) Taut
(3) | s @skj → (@
s
jk → @
s
jk) (MP ) : (1), (2)
(4) | s (@sjk → @
s
jk)→ @
s
jk PL
(5) | s @skj → @
s
jk PL
(6) | s @sjk → @
s
kj Analogue
(7) | s @sjk ↔ @
s
kj PL:(5), (6)
(Bridge)
(1) | s σ(. . . φi1 , j, φi+1 . . .) ∧ σ
(. . . ,¬φi−1, φ,¬φi+1, . . .)→
σ(. . . φi−1, j ∧ φ, φi+1, . . .) ML
(2) | s j ∧ φ→ @sjφ (Intro)
(3) | s σ(. . . φi−1, j ∧ φ, φi+1, . . .)→ σ(. . . φi−1,@sjφ, φi+1, . . .) ML
(4) | s σ(. . . φi−1,@sjφ, φi+1, . . .)→ @
s
jφ (Back)
(5) | s σ(. . . φi1 , j, φi+1 . . .) ∧ σ
(. . . ,¬φi−1, φ,¬φi+1, . . .)→ @
s
jφ PL
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(6) | s σ(. . . φi1 , j, φi+1 . . .) ∧ σ
(. . . ,¬φi−1,¬φ,¬φi+1, . . .)→ @sj¬φ (5)
(7) | s ¬@sj¬φ→ ¬(σ(. . . φi1 , j, φi+1 . . .) ∧ σ
(. . . ,¬φi−1,¬φ,¬φi+1, . . .)) PL
(8) | s @sjφ→ (¬σ(. . . φi1 , j, φi+1 . . .) ∨ ¬σ
(. . . ,¬φi−1,¬φ,¬φi+1, . . .)) PL
(9) | s @sjφ→ (¬σ(. . . φi1 , j, φi+1 . . .) ∨ σ(. . . , φi−1, φ, φi+1, . . .)) (Dual)
(9) | s @sjφ→ (σ(. . . φi1 , j, φi+1 . . .)→ σ(. . . , φi−1, φ, φi+1, . . .)) PL
(10) | s @sjφ ∧ σ(. . . φi1 , j, φi+1 . . .)→ σ(. . . , φi−1, φ, φi+1, . . .) PL
2.
(1) | s j → (¬φ↔ @sj¬φ) (Intro)
(2) | s j → (¬φ↔ @sj¬φ)→ (j → (@
s
j¬φ→ ¬φ)) PL
(3) | s j → (@sj¬φ→ ¬φ) (MP ) : (1), (2)
(4) | s (j → (@sj¬φ→ ¬φ))→ (j ∧@
s
j¬φ→ ¬φ) PL
(5) | s j ∧@sj¬φ→ ¬φ (MP ) : (3), (4)
(6) | s φ→ (¬j ∨@sjφ) PL,(SelfDual)
(7) | s φ→ j hypothesis
(8) | s φ→ (¬j ∨@sjφ) ∧ j PL
(9) | s φ→ @sjφ ∧ j PL
(10) | s (φ→ @sjφ) ∧ (φ→ j) PL
(11) | s φ→ @sjφ PL
Therefore, if | s φ→ j then | s φ→ @sjφ.
(1) | s φ→ j hypothesis
(2) | t σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . .)→ σ(. . . , ψi−1, j, ψi+1, . . .) ML(1)
(3) | s φ→ @sjφ (1)
(4) | t σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . .)→ σ(. . . , ψi−1,@sjφ, ψi+1, . . .) ML(3)
(5) | t σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . .)→ @tjφ (Back),PL(4)
(6) | t σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . .)→ (σ(. . . , ψi−1, j, ψi+1, . . .) ∧@
t
jφ) PL:(2), (5)
Therefore, if | s φ→ j then | t σ(. . . , φ, . . .)→ σ(. . . , j, . . .) ∧@tjφ.
Let ⊥s denote a formula of sort s that is nowhere true. If s ∈ S and Γs is a
set of formulas of sort s, then Γs is consistent if Γs 6|
s ⊥s. An inconsistent set
of formulas is a set of formulas of the same sort that is not consistent. Maximal
consistent sets are defined as usual.
In the rest of the section we develop the proof of the strong completeness
theorem for our hybrid logical systems, possibly extended with additional ax-
ioms. If Λ is a set of formulas, we denote by H(@) + Λ and H(@, ∀) + Λ the
systems obtained when the formulas of Λ are seen as additional axiom schemes.
The main steps are: the extended Lindenbaum Lemma, the construction
of the Henkin model and the Truth Lemma (all of them extending the similar
results in the mono-sorted case). In order to state our extended Lindenbaum
Lemma, we need to define the named, pasted and @-witnessed sets of formulas.
Definition 3.17 (Named, pasted and @-witnessed sets). Let s ∈ S and Γs be
a set of formulas of sort s from HΣ(@). We say that
• Γs is named if one of its elements is a nominal or a constant nominal,
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• Γs is pasted if, for any t ∈ S, σ ∈ Σs1···sn,t, k ∈ NOMt ∪ Nt, and φ a
formula of sort si, whenever @
s
kσ(. . . , φi−1, φ, φi+1, . . .) ∈ Γs there exists a
nominal j ∈ NOMsi such that @
s
kσ(. . . , φi−1, j, φi+1, . . .) ∈ Γs and @
s
jφ ∈
Γs.
If Γs be a set of formulas of sort s from HΣ(@, ∀) then we say that
• Γs is @-witnessed if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(-) for s′, t ∈ S , x ∈ SVARt, k ∈ NOMs′ ∪ Ns′ and any formula φ
of sort s′, whenever @sk∃xφ ∈ Γs there exists j ∈ NOMt such that
@skφ[j/x] ∈ Γs,
(-) for any t ∈ S and x ∈ SVARt there is js ∈ NOMt such that @sjxx ∈
Γs.
Lemma 3.18 (Extended Lindenbaum Lemma). Let Λ be a set of formulas
in the language of HΣ(@) (in the language of HΣ(@, ∀)) and s ∈ S. Then any
consistent set Γs of formulas of sort s from HΣ(@)+Λ (from HΣ(@, ∀)+Λ) can
be extended to a named and pasted (named, pasted and @-witnessed ) maximal
consistent set by adding countably many nominals to the language.
Proof. The proof generalizes to the S-sorted setting well-known proofs for the
mono-sorted hybrid logic, see [6, Lemma 7.25], [3, Lemma 3, Lemma 4], [4,
Lemma 3.9].
For each sort s ∈ S, we add a set of new nominals and enumerate this set.
Given a set of formulas Γs, define Γ
k
s to be Γs ∪ {ks} ∪ {@
s
jx
x| x ∈ SVARs},
where ks is the first new nominal of sort s in our enumeration and jx are such
that if x and y are different state variables of sort s then also jx and jy are
different nominals of same sort s. Now that we know we are working on the sort
s, we will write k instead of ks.
Suppose Γks is not consistent. Then there exists some conjunction of formulas
θ ∈ Γs such that |
s k → ¬θ. We use the (Gen@) rule and the (K@) axiom
to prove that | s @skk → @
s
k¬θ. From the (Ref) axiom and the (MP ) rule it
follows | s @sk¬θ. Remember that k is a new nominal, so it does not occur in θ
and we use (Name@) rule to get that | s ¬θ ⇒ ¬θ ∈ Γs. But this contradicts
the consistency of Γs. Now, we prove the case for the additional @
s
jx
x formulas.
Suppose | s θ → ¬@sjxx. We use the (SelfDual) axiom to get |
s ¬θ ∨@sjx¬x.
If | s ¬θ, this contradicts the consistency of Γs. If |
s @sjx¬x, then |
s
= @sjx¬x.
Hence, for any modelM, any assignment function g and any world w ∈Ws, we
have M, g, w |
s
= @sjx¬x if and only if M, g, v |
s
= ¬x where V Ns (jx) = {v}. Then
for any model M and any assignment g, gs(x) 6= V Ns (jx), contradiction.
Now we enumerate on each sort s ∈ S all the formulas of the new language
obtained by adding the set of new nominals and define Γ0 := Γks . Suppose we
have defined Γm, where m ≥ 0. Let φm+1 be the m + 1 − th formula of sort
s in the previous enumeration. We define Γm+1 as follows. If Γm ∪ {φm+1} is
inconsistent, then Γm+1 = Γm. Otherwise:
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(i) Γm+1 = Γm ∪ {φm+1}, if φm+1 is neither of the form @jσ(. . . , ϕ, . . .), nor
of the form @j∃xϕ(x), where j is any nominal of sort s′′, ϕ a formula of
sort s′′ and x ∈ SVARs′′ .
(ii) Γm+1 = Γm ∪ {φm+1} ∪ {@jσ(. . . , k, . . .) ∧ @kϕ}, if φm+1 is of the form
@jσ(. . . , ϕ, . . .).
(iii) Γm+1 = Γm∪{φm+1}∪{@jϕ[k/x]}, where φm+1 is of the form @j∃xϕ(x).
In clauses (ii) and (iii), k is the first new nominal in the enumeration that does
not occur neither in Γi for all i ≤ m, nor in @jσ(. . . , ϕ, . . .).
Let Γ+ =
⋃
n≥0 Γ
n. Because k ∈ Γ0 ⊆ Γ+, this set in named, maximal,
pasted and @-witnessed by construction. We will check if it is consistent for the
expansion made in the second and third items.
Suppose Γm+1 = Γm ∪ {φm+1} ∪ {@jσ(. . . , k, . . .) ∧ @kϕ} is an inconsis-
tent set, where φm+1 is @jσ(. . . , ϕ, . . .). Then there is a conjunction of for-
mulas χ ∈ Γm ∪ {φm+1} such that |
s χ→ ¬(@jσ(. . . , k, . . .) ∧@kϕ) and so
| s @jσ(. . . , k, . . .) ∧@kϕ→ ¬χ. But k is the first new nominal in the enumera-
tion that does not occur neither in Γm, nor in @jσ(. . . , ϕ, . . .) and by Paste rule
we get | s @jσ(. . . , ϕ, . . .)→ ¬χ⇒|
s χ→ ¬@jσ(. . . , ϕ, . . .), which contradicts
the consistency of Γm ∪ {φm+1}.
Suppose Γm+1 = Γm ∪ {φm+1} ∪ {@jϕ[k/x]} is inconsistent, where φm+1
is @j∃xϕ(x). Then there is a conjunction of formulas χ ∈ Γm ∪ {φm+1} such
that | s χ→ ¬@jϕ[k/x], where k is the new nominal. By generalization on
nominals (Lemma 3.14) we can prove | s ∀y(χ → ¬@jϕ[y/x]), where y is a
state variable that does not occur in χ → ¬@jϕ[k/x]. Using (Q1) axiom, we
get | s χ → ∀y¬@jϕ[y/x] and by (SelfDual) |
s χ → ∀y@j¬ϕ[y/x]. Next,
we use (Barcan@) to get | s χ → @j∀y¬ϕ[y/x]). Because x has no free oc-
currences in ϕ[y/x], we can prove that @j∀y¬ϕ[y/x]) ↔ @j∀x¬ϕ. Therefore,
| s χ→ @j∀x¬ϕ , so |
s χ → @j¬∃xϕ . Use once again (SelfDual) and we
have | s χ→ ¬@j∃xϕ. Then ¬@j∃xϕ ∈ Γm∪{φm+1}, but this contradicts the
consistency of Γm ∪ {φm+1}.
We are now ready to define a Henkin model, see [1, 3] for the mono-sorted
hybrid modal logic.
Definition 3.19 (The Henkin model). Let s ∈ S and assume Γs is a maximal
consistent set of formulas of sort s from HΣ(@) (from HΣ(@, ∀)). For any t ∈ S
and j ∈ NOMt ∪Nt we define |j| = {k ∈ NOMt ∪Nt |@sjk ∈ Γs}. The Henkin
model is MΓs = (WΓ, (RΓσ)σ∈Σ, (|c|)c∈N , V
Γ) where
WΓt = {|j| |j ∈ NOMt ∪Nt} for any t ∈ S
(|j|, |j1|, . . . , |jn|) ∈ RΓσ iff @
s
jσ(j1, . . . , jn) ∈ Γs for any σ ∈ Σt1···tn,t
V Γt (p) = {|j| |j ∈ NOMt ∪ Nt,@
s
jp ∈ Γs}
for any t ∈ S and p ∈ PROPt
V Γt (j) = {|j|} for any t ∈ S and j ∈ NOMt.
For the system HΣ(@, ∀), under the additional assumption that Γs is @-witnessed,
we define the assignment gΓ : SVAR→WΓ by
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gΓt (x) = |j| where t ∈ S, x ∈ SVARt and j ∈ NOMt such that @
s
jx ∈ Γs.
Lemma 3.20. The Henkin model from Definition 3.19 is well-defined.
Proof. Let s ∈ S and assume that Γs is a set of formulas of sort s. Note that
RΓσ is well-defined by (Nom) and (Bridge) from Lemma 3.16. For t ∈ S and
j ∈ NOMt, V Γ(j) is well-defined by axiom (Ref). For the system HΣ(@, ∀), we
further that Γs is also @-witnessed so, for any t ∈ S and x ∈ SVARt, there is a
nominal j ∈ NOMt such that @sjx ∈ Γ. The fact that g
Γ is well-defined follows
by (Nomx).
Lemma 3.21 (Truth Lemma). 1. Let s ∈ S and assume Γs is a named and
pasted maximal consistent set of formulas of sort s from HΣ(@). For any
sort t ∈ S, j ∈ NOMt ∪ Nt and for any formula φ of sort t we have
MΓ, |j| |
t
= φ iff @sjφ ∈ Γs.
2. Let s ∈ S and assume Γs is a named, pasted and @-witnessed maximal
consistent set of formulas of sort s from HΣ(@, ∀). For any sort s′ ∈ S,
j ∈ NOMs′ ∪Ns′ and for any formula φ of sort s′ we have MΓ, gΓ, |j| |
s′
=
φ iff @sjφ ∈ Γs.
Proof. We make the proof by structural induction on φ.
• MΓ, |j| |
s′
= a, where a ∈ PROPs′∪NOMs′∪Ns′ iff |j| ∈ V Ns′ (a) iff @
s
ja ∈ Γs.
• MΓ, |j| |
s′
= x, where x ∈ SVARs′ iff gΓs′(x) = |j| iff @
s
jx ∈ Γs.
• MΓ, |j| |
s′
= ¬φ iff MΓ, |j| 6|
s′
= φ iff @sjφ 6∈ Γs, but we work with consistent
sets, therefore @sjφ 6∈ Γs iff ¬@
s
jφ ∈ Γs iff @
s
j¬φ ∈ Γs (SelfDual).
• MΓ, |j| |
s′
= φ ∨ ϕ iff MΓ, |j| |
s′
= φ or MΓ, |j| |
s′
= ϕ iff (inductive hypothesis)
@sjφ ∈ Γs or @
s
jϕ ∈ Γs iff @
s
jφ ∨@
s
jϕ ∈ Γs iff @
s
j(φ ∨ ϕ) ∈ Γs.
• MΓ, |j| |
s′
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn) iff exists |ki| ∈Wsi such that R|j||k1| . . . |kn| and
MΓ, |ki| |
si= φi for any i ∈ [n]. Using the induction hypothesis, we get
@skiφi ∈ Γs. But R|j||k1| . . . |kn| iff @
s
jσ(k1, . . . , kn) ∈ Γs. Use the Bridge
axiom to prove @sjσ(k1, . . . , kn)∧@
s
k1
φ1∧ . . .∧@sknφn → @
s
jσ(φ1, . . . , φn),
so @sjσ(φ1, . . . , φn) ∈ Γs. Now, suppose @
s
jσ(φ1, . . . , φn) ∈ Γs. We work
with pasted models, so there are some nominals ki such that @
s
jσ(k1, . . . , kn) ∈
Γs and @
s
ki
φi ∈ Γs for any i ∈ [n]. Therefore, exists ki such that
R|j||k1| . . . |kn| and, by induction hypothesis,MΓ, |ki| |
si= φi for any i ∈ [n]
if and only if MΓ, |j| |
s′
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn).
• MΓ, |j| |
s′
= @s
′
k φ iffM
Γ, |k| |
s′′
= φ , but from induction hypothesis @skφ ∈ Γs
and by applying (Agree) we get @sj@
s
kφ ∈ Γs.
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Further, for theHΣ(@, ∀) system, we need to pay attention to the assignment
function and it only affects the following cases.
• @sj∃xφ ∈ Γs, then there exists l ∈ NOMs′ such that @
s
jφ[l/x] ∈ Γs. Let
g′
x
∼ gΓ such that g′s′(x) = {|l|}. Therefore, there exists l ∈ NOMs′ such
that g′s′(x) = {|l|}, g
′ x∼ gΓ and MΓ, g′, |j| |
s′
= φ iff MΓ, gΓ, |j| |
s′
= ∃xφ.
• MΓ, gΓ, |j| |
s′
= ∃xφ iff exists g′
x
∼ gΓ and MΓ, g′, |j| |
s′
= φ. Let g′s′(x) =
{|l|}. Hence, there exists l ∈ NOMs′ such that g′s′(x) = {|l|}, g
′ x∼ gΓ
and MΓ, g′, |j| |
s′
= φ iff MΓ, g, |j| |
s′
= φ[l/x] and from inductive hypothesis
@sjφ[l/x] ∈ Γs. Use the contrapositive of the (Q2) axiom, |
s′ φ[l/x]→ ∃xφ
and the (Gen@) and (K@) rules to obtain @sjφ[l/x] → @
s
j∃xφ ∈ Γs.
Therefore, @sj∃xφ ∈ Γs.
We are ready now to prove the strong completeness theorem for the hybrid
logics HΣ(@) and HΣ(@, ∀) extended with axioms from Λ. For a logic L, the
relation | s
L
denotes the local deduction, the relation |
s
=Mod(L) denotes the
semantic entailment w.r.t. models satisfying all the axioms of L, while |
s
=L
denotes the semantic entailment w.r.t. frames satisfying all the axioms of L.
Theorem 3.22 (Completeness). 1. Strong model-completeness. Let Λ be a
set of formulas in the language of HΣ(@) (a set of formulas in the language
of HΣ(@, ∀)) and s ∈ S and assume Γs is a set of formulas of sort s. If
Γs is a consistent set in L = HΣ(@) + Λ (in L = HΣ(@, ∀) + Λ) then Γs
has a model that is also a model of Λ. Consequently, for a formula φ of
sort s, Γs|
s
=Mod(L)φ iff Γs |
s
L
φ.
2. Strong frame-completeness for pure extensions. Let Λ be a set of pure for-
mulas in the language of HΣ(@) (a set of ∀∃-pure formulas in the language
of HΣ(@, ∀)) and s ∈ S and assume Γs is a set of formulas of sort s. If Γs
is a consistent set in L = HΣ(@)+Λ (in L = HΣ(@, ∀)+Λ) then Γs has a
model based on a frame that validates every formula in Λ. Consequently,
for a formula φ of sort s, Γs|
s
=Mod(L)φ iff Γs |
s
L
φ.
Proof. Since 1. is obvious, we only prove 2. If Γs is a consistent set in
HΣ(@, ∀)+Λ then, applying the Extended Lindenbaum Lemma, then Γs ⊆ Θs,
where Θs is a maximal consistent named, pasted and @-witnessed set (in an
extended language L′). If MΘ is the Henkin model and gΘ is the assignment
from Definition 3.19 then, by Truth Lemma,MΘ, gΘ, |j| |
s
= Γs for any t ∈ S and
j ∈ NOMt ∪Nt. Moreover, MΘ is a named model (in the extended language)
that is also a model of Λ. By Proposition 3.11, the underlying frame of MΘ
satisfies the ∀∃-pure formulas from Λ. Hence the logic HΣ(@, ∀)+Λ is strongly
complete w.r.t to the class of frames satisfying Λ. Assume that Γs|
s
=Λφ and
suppose that Γs 6|
s φ. It follows that Γs ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent, so there exists
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a model of Γs based on a frame satisfying Λ that is not a model of φ. We get a
contradiction, so the intended completeness result is proved.
The following useful results can be easily proved semantically:
Proposition 3.23. 1. (Nominal Conjunction) For any formulas and any
nominals of appropriate sorts, the following hold:
(i1) σ(. . . , φi−1, φi, φi+1, . . .)∧@k(ψ)↔ σ(. . . , φi−1, φi∧@k(ψ), φi+1, . . .)
(i2) σ(. . . , φi−1, φi, φi+1, . . .) ∧@k(ψ)↔
σ(. . . , φi−1, φi ∧@k(ψ), φi+1, . . .) ∧@k(ψ)
2. If φ1, . . . φn are formulas of appropriate sorts and x is a state variable that
does not occur in φj for any j 6= i then:
(i3) ∃xσ(. . . , φi−1, φi, φi+1, . . .)→ σ(, . . . , φi−1, ∃xφi, φi+1, . . .)
Proof. 1. (Nominal Conjunction)
(i1) M, g, w |
s
= σ(. . . , φi−1, φi, φi+1, . . .) ∧@k(ψ) iff
M, g, w |
s
= @k(ψ) and M, g, w |
s
= σ(. . . , φi−1, φi, φi+1, . . .) iff
M, g, v |
s′
= ψ where V Ns′ = {v} and there exist w1 ∈ Ws1 , . . . , wn ∈ Wsn
such that Rσww1 · · ·wn and M, g, wj |
sj
= φj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n iff
there exist w1 ∈Ws1 , . . . , wn ∈Wsn such that Rσww1 · · ·wn and
M, g, wj |
sj
= φj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i, and M, g, wi |
si= φi ∧@k(ψ) iff
M, g, w |= σ(. . . , φi−1, φi ∧@k(ψ), φi+1, . . .)
(i2) M, g, w |
s
= σ(. . . , φi−1, φi, φi+1, . . .) ∧@k(ψ) iff
M, g, w |
s
= @k(ψ) and M, g, w |
s
= ¬σ(. . . ,¬φi−1,¬φi,¬φi+1, . . .) iff
M, g, v |
s′
= ψ where V Ns′ = {v} and for all w1 ∈ Ws1 , . . . , wn ∈ Wsn for
which Rσww1 · · ·wn, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that M, g, wj |
sj
= φj iff
M, g, v |
s′
= ψ where V Ns′ = {v} and for all w1 ∈ Ws1 , . . . , wn ∈ Wsn for
which Rσww1 · · ·wn, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i such thatM, g, wj |
sj
= φj
or M, g, wi |
si= φi iff M, g, v |
s′
= ψ and for all w1 ∈ Ws1 , . . . , wn ∈ Wsn for
which Rσww1 · · ·wn, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i such thatM, g, wj |
sj
= φj
orM, g, wi |
si= φi∧@k(ψ) iffM, g, w |
s
= σ(. . . , φi−1, φi∧@k(ψ), φi+1, . . .)∧
@k(ψ)
2.
(i3) M, g, w |
s
= ∃xσ(φ1, . . . , φi−1, φi, φi+1, . . . , φn) iff exists g′
x
∼ g such that
M, g′, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φi−1, φi, φi+1, . . . , φn) iff exists g
′ x∼ g such that
for all vj ∈ Wsj , Rσwv1 . . . vn implies M, g
′, vj |
sj
= φj for some j ∈ [n].
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Then, for all vj ∈ Wsj , Rσwv1 . . . vn implies there exists g
′ x∼ g such that
M, g′, vj |
sj
= φj for some j ∈ [n]. But x does not occur in φj for any
j ∈ [n] and j 6= i, so for all vj ∈ Wsj and vi ∈ Wsi , Rσwv1 . . . vi . . . vn
implies M, g′, vj |
sj
= φj and there exists g
′ x∼ g such that M, g′, vi |
si=
φi for some i, j ∈ [n] and j 6= i. We use Agreement Lemma, for all
vj ∈ Wsj and vi ∈ Wsi , Rσwv1 . . . vi . . . vn implies M, g, vj |
sj
= φj and
M, g, vi |
si= ∃xφi for some i, j ∈ [n] and j 6= i. Therefore, M, g, w |
s
=
σ(φ1, . . . , φi−1, ∃xφi, φi+1, . . . , φn).
In the many-sorted setting one can wonder what happens if we have an S-
sorted set of deduction hypothesis Γ = {Γs}s∈S . The following considerations
hold for any of HΣ(@) and HΣ(@, ∀). Clearly, a model M is a model of Γ if
M |
s
= γs for any s ∈ S and γs ∈ Γs (in this case we write M |= Γ). Using
the ”broadcasting” properties of the @i operators, we define another syntactic
consequence relation:
Γ |
s
∼ φ iff there are s1, . . . , sn ∈ S, j1 ∈ NOMs1 , . . . , jn ∈ NOMsn and
γ1 ∈ Γs1 , . . . , γn ∈ Γsn such that |
s @sj1γ1 ∧ · · · ∧@
s
jn
γn → φ.
Proposition 3.24 ( |
s
∼ soundness). Let Γ be an S-sorted set and φ a formula
of sort s ∈ S. If Γ |
s
∼ ϕ then M |= Γ implies M |
s
= φ for any model M.
Proof. Let M be a model and assume | s @sj1γ1 ∧ · · · ∧@
s
jn
γn → φ as above. If
M |= Γ then, by (Gen@), M |
s
= Γs ∪ {@sj1γ1, . . . ,@
s
jn
γn}. Using the soundness
of the local deduction, we get the desired conclusion.
4 A SMC-like language and a Hoare-like logic
for it
To showcase the application of our logic into program verification, we have
chosen to specify a state-machine, whose expressions have side effects and where
Hoare-like semantics are known to be hard to use.
In Figure 3, we introduce the signature Σ = (S,Σ, N) of our logic as a
context-free grammar (CFG) in a BNF-like form. We make use of the established
equivalence between CFGs and algebraic signatures (see, e.g., [15]), by mapping
non-terminals to sorts and CFG productions to operation symbols. Note that,
due to non-terminal renamings (e.g., AExp ::= Nat), it may seem that our
syntax relies on subsorting. However, this is done for readability reasons only.
The renaming of non-terminals in syntax can be thought of as syntactic sugar
for defining injection functions. For example, AExp ::= Nat can be thought of
as AExp ::= nat2Exp(Nat), and all occurrences of an integer term in a context,
in which an expression is expected, could be wrapped by the nat2Exp function.
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Our language is inspired by the SMC machine [19] which consists of a set of
transition rules defined between configurations of the form 〈S,M,C〉, where S
is the value stack of intermediate results, M represents the memory, mapping
program identifiers to values, and C is a control stack of commands representing
the control flow of the program. Since our target is to extend the Propositional
Dynamic Logic (PDL) [14], we identify the control stack with the notion of pro-
gram in dynamic logic, and use the ”;” operator to denote stack composition.
We define our formulas to stand for configurations of the form 〈vs,mem〉 com-
prising only of a value stack and a memory. Hence, the sorts CtrlStack and
Config correspond to programs and formulas from PDL, respectively. Inspired
by PDL, we use the dual modal operator [ ] : CtrlStack×Config → Config to
assert that a configuration formula must hold after executing the commands in
the control stack. The axioms defining the dynamic logic semantics of the SMC
machine are then formulas of the form cfg → [ctrl]cfg′ saying that a configura-
tion satisfying cfg must change to one satisfying cfg′ after executing ctrl. The
usual operations of dynamic logic ;, ∪, ∗ are defined accordingly [14, Chapter
5]. We depart from PDL with the definition of ? (test): in our setting, in order
to take a decision, we test the top value of the value stack. Consequently, the
signature of the test operator is ? : V al → CtrlStack.
A deductive system, that allows us to accomplish our goal, is defined in
Figure 3. In this way we define an expansion of H(@, ∀). Our definition is
incomplete (e.g. we do not fully axiomatize the natural numbers), but one can
see that,e.g. NBool = {true, false}. To simplify the presentation, we omit sort
annotations in the sequel; these should be easily inferrable from the context.
Remark 4.1. Assume that Λ contains all the axioms from Figure and denote
L = H(@, ∀) + Λ. Then L is a many-valued hybrid modal system associated to
our language, and all results from Section 3 applies in this case. In particular,
the system enjoys strong model-completeness. Moreover, we can safely assume
that Λ contains only ∀∃-pure formulas, so L is strongly complete w.r.t the class
of frames satisfying Λ by Theorem 3.22.
We present below several Hoare-like rules of inference. Note that they are
provable from the PDL and language axioms.
Proposition 4.2. The following rules are admissible :
1. Rules of Consequence
If ⊢ φ→ [α]ψ and ⊢ ψ → χ then ⊢ φ→ [α]χ.
If ⊢ φ→ [α]ψ and ⊢ χ→ φ then ⊢ χ→ [α]ψ.
2. Rule of Composition, iterated
If φ0 → [α1]φ1, . . . , φn−1 → [αn]φn, then φ0 → [α1; . . . ;αn]φn.
3. Rule of Conditional
If B is a formula of sort Bool, and vs, mem, P are formulas of appropriate
sorts such that
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Domains
Nat ::= natural numbers
Bool ::= true | false | Nat == Nat | Nat <= Nat
Syntax
Var ::= program variables
AExp ::= Nat | Var | AExp + AExp
| ++ Var
BExp ::= AExp <= AExp
Stmt ::= x := AExp
| if BExp
then Stmt
else Stmt
| while BExp do Stmt
| skip
| Stmt ; Stmt
Semantics
Val ::= Nat | Bool
ValStack ::= nil
| Val . ValStack
Mem ::= empty | set(Mem, x, n)
CtrlStack ::= c(AExp)
| c(BExp)
| c(Stmt)
| asgn(x)
| plus | leq
| Val ?
| c1 ; c2
Config ::= < ValStack, Mem >
Domains axioms (incomplete)
(B1) true↔ ¬ false (I1) @Nattrue(x == y)→ (x↔ y)
. . . . . .
PDL-inspired axioms
(A∪) [pi ∪ pi′]γ ↔ [pi]γ ∧ [pi′]γ (A; ) [pi;pi′]γ ↔ [pi][pi′]γ
(A?) 〈v · vs,mem〉→ [v?] 〈vs,mem〉 (A¬?) 〈v · vs,mem〉 ∧@v(¬v
′)→ [v′?]⊥
(A∗) [pi∗]γ ↔ γ ∧ [pi][pi∗]γ (AInd) γ ∧ [pi∗](γ → [pi]γ)→ [pi∗]γ
Here, pi, pi′ are formulas of sort CtrlStack (”programs”), γ is a formula of sort Config
(the analogue of ”formulas” from PDL), v and v′ are state variables of sort V ar, vs
has the sort V alStack and mem has the sort Mem.
SMC-inspired axioms
(CStmt) c(s1; s2)↔ c(s1); c(s2)
(Aint) 〈vs,mem〉→ [c(n)] 〈n · vs,mem〉 where n is an integer
(Aid) 〈vs, set(mem,x, n〉)→ [c(x)] 〈n · vs, set(mem,x, n〉)
(A++) 〈vs, set(mem,x, n〉)→ [c(+ + x)] 〈n+ 1 · vs, set(mem,x, n+ 1〉)
(Dplus) c(a1 + a2)↔ c(a1); c(a2);plus
(Aplus) 〈n2 · n1 · vs,mem〉→ [plus] 〈(n1 + n2〉 · vs,mem)
(Dleq) c(a1 <= a2)↔ c(a2); c(a1); leq
(Aleq) 〈n1 · n2 · vs,mem〉→ [leq] 〈(n1 ≤ n2〉 · vs,mem)
(Askip) γ → [c(skip)]γ
(Dasgn) c(x := a)↔ c(a);asgn (x)
(Aasgn) 〈n · vs,mem〉→ [asgn (x)] 〈vs, set(mem,x, n〉)
(Dif) c(if b then s1 else s2)↔ c(b); ((true ?; c(s1)) ∪ (false ?; c(s2)))
(Dwhile) c(while b do s)↔ c(b); (true?; c(s); c(b))∗; false?
Memory consistency axioms
(AMem1) set(set(mem,x, n), y,m)↔ set(set(mem,y,m), x, n)
where x and y are distinct
(AMem2) set(set(mem,x, n), x,m)→ set(mem,x,m)
Figure 3: Axioms defining an SMC-like programming language
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(h1) ⊢ φ→ [c(b)](〈B · vs,mem〉 ∧ P ),
(h2) ⊢ 〈vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@true(B)→ [c(s1)]χ
(h3) ⊢ 〈vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@false(B)→ [c(s2)]χ
(h4) ⊢ P → [α]P for any α of sort CtrlStack,
then ⊢ φ→ [c(if b then s1 else s2)]χ
Proof. In the sequel we shall mention the sort of a formula only when it is
necessary.
1. Rule of Consequence follows easily by (UG).
2. Rule of Composition follows easily by (UG) and (CStmt).
3. Rule of Conditional. Since B is a formula of sort Bool, using the axiom
(B1) and the completeness theorem, one can easily infer that
⊢ B ↔ (true ∧@trueB) ∨ (false ∧@falseB)
Using the fact that any operator σ ∈ Σ commutes with disjunctions,
Lemma 3.23 we get
(∗) ⊢ 〈B · vs,mem〉→ (〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧@trueB)∨
(〈false ·vs,mem〉 ∧@falseB)
Now we prove that
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧@trueB → [(true?; c(s1)) ∪ (false; c(s2))]χ.
Note that ⊢ @true(¬ false), so we use (A?) and (A¬?) as follows:
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉∧@trueB → 〈true ·vs,mem〉∧@trueB∧@true(¬ false)
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉→ [true?] 〈vs,mem〉
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧@true(¬ false)→ [false?]⊥
Next we prove that
(@[]) ⊢ @kϕ→ [α]@kϕ
for any formulas α, ϕ and nominal k of appropriate sorts. Note that
⊢ [α]⊤ so, using Lemma 3.23, we have the following chain of inferences:
⊢ @kϕ→ @kϕ ∧ [α]⊤
⊢ @kϕ ∧ [α]⊤ → [α]@kϕ
and (@[]) easily follows.
Consequently ⊢ @trueB → [true?]@trueB
Since dual operators σ for σ ∈ Σ commutes with conjunctions, using also
(h4) we get
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉∧P ∧@trueB → ([true?](〈vs,mem〉∧P ∧@trueB)) ∧
[false?]⊥
By (h2) and (K) it follows that
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧ ∧P@trueB → [true?; c(s1)]χ ∧ [false?]⊥
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Since ⊥ → [c(s2)]χ, and using (A∪) we proved
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@trueB → [(true?; c(s1)) ∪ (false?; c(s2))]χ.
In a similar way, we get
⊢ 〈false ·vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@falseB → [(true?; c(s1)) ∪ (false?; c(s2))]χ.
By (∗) we infer
⊢ 〈B · vs,mem〉→ [(true?; c(s1)) ∪ (false?; c(s2))]χ
Using (K) and (Dif) we get the conclusion.
Note that our Rule of Conditional requires two more hypotheses, (h1) and
(h4) than the inspiring rule in Hoare-logic. (h1) is needed because language
expressions are no longer identical to formulas and need to be evaluated; in
particular this allows for expressions to have side effects. (h4) is useful to carry
over extra conditions through the rule; note that (h4) holds for all @jϕ formulas.
Similarly, the Rule of Iteration needs to take into account the evaluation
steps required for evaluating the condition. Moreover, since assignment is now
handled by a forwards-going operational rule, we require existential quantifica-
tion over the invariant to account for the values of the program variables in the
memory, and work with instances of the existentially quantified variables.
Proposition 4.3 (Rule of Iteration). Let B, vs, mem, and P be formulas with
variables over x, where x is a set of state variables. If there exist substitutions
xinit and xbody for the variables of x such that:
(h1) ⊢ φ→ [c(b)](〈B · vs,mem〉 ∧ P )[xinit/x],
(h2) ⊢ 〈vs,mem〉∧P ∧@true(B)→ [c(s); c(b)](〈B · vs,mem〉∧P )[xbody/x]
(h3) ⊢ P → [α]P for any formula α of sort CtrlStack
then ⊢ φ→ [c(while b do s)]∃x 〈vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@false(B).
Proof. Denote θ := 〈B · vs,mem〉 ∧ P and θI := ∃xθ. We think of θI as being
the invariant of while b do s. Note that, using the contraposition of (Q2) and
(h1) we infer that
(c1) ⊢ φ→ [c(b)]θI
In the following we firstly prove that
(c2) ⊢ θI → [α]θI ,
where α =true?; c(s); c(b). Since
⊢ B ↔ (true ∧@trueB) ∨ (false ∧@falseB)
it follows that
⊢ θ → (〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@trueB) ∨ (〈false ·vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@falseB)
By (A?), (h3) and (@[]) (from the proof of Proposition 4.2) we infer
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@trueB → [true?](〈vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@trueB)
and, by (h2)
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@trueB)→ [α]θ[xbody/x]
Since ⊢ @false(¬ true), by (A¬?) we get
⊢ 〈false ·vs,mem〉 ∧@false(¬ true)→ [true?]⊥, so
⊢ 〈false ·vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@falseB)→ [α]θ[xbody/x]
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As consequence ⊢ θ → [α]θ[xbody/x] and, using the contraposition of Q2,
we infer that θ → [α]θI . We use now the fact that
⊢ ∀x(ϕ(x)→ ψ)→ (∃xϕ(x)→ ψ) if x does not appear in ψ,
which leads us to ⊢ θI → [α]θI . Using (UG) we get ⊢ [c(b);α∗](θI → [α]θI).
By (c1) it follows that
⊢ φ→ ([c(b)]θI ∧ ([c(b);α∗](θI → [α]θI))
Using the induction axiom, (UG), (K) and the fact that the dual operators
commutes with conjunctions, we get
⊢ ([c(b)]θI ∧ ([c(b);α∗](θI → [α]θI))→ [c(b);α∗]θI
so ⊢ φ→ [c(b);α∗]θI , which proves the invariant property of while b do s.
To conclude, so far we proved
⊢ φ→ [c(b);α∗]∃xθ
We can safely assume that the state variables from x do not appear in φ, b
Note that c(while b do s)↔ c(b);α∗; false?
As before,
⊢ θ → (〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@trueB) ∨ (〈false ·vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@falseB)
Using again (A?) and (A¬?) we have that
⊢ 〈false ·vs,mem〉→ [false?] 〈vs,mem〉
⊢ 〈true ·vs,mem〉 ∧@true(¬ false)→ [false?]⊥
It follows that
⊢ θ → [false?](< vs,mem > ∧P ∧ @falseB) so, using the properties of the
existential binder
⊢ ∃xθ → ∃x[false?](< vs,mem > ∧P ∧@falseB)
Since the state variables from x do not appear in false?, by Lemma 3.23 it
follows that
⊢ ∃x[false?](< vs,mem > ∧P ∧@falseB)→
[false?]∃x(< vs,mem > ∧P ∧@falseB)
We can finally obtain the intended result:
⊢ φ→ [c(b);α∗; false?]∃x(< vs,mem > ∧P ∧@falseB)
Proving a program correct. Let us now exhibit proving a program using
the operational semantics and the Hoare-like rules above. Consider the program:
s := 0 ; i := 0 ;
while ++ i <= n do s := s + i ;
Let pgm stand for the entire program. We want to prove that if the initial
value of n is any natural number, then the final value of s is the sum of numbers
from 1 to n. Formally,
〈vs, set(mem, n, vn〉→
[c(pgm)] 〈vs, set(set(set(mem, n, vn〉 , s, vn ∗ (vn+ 1)/2), i, vn+ 1))
Let Cnd stand for + + i <= n and Body stand for s := s+ i. By applying
the axioms above we can decompose pgm as
c(pgm)↔ c(0); asgn (s); c(0); asgn (i); c(while Cnd do Body)
27
Similarly, c(Cnd)↔ c(++ i); c(n); leq and c(Body)↔ c(s); c(i);plus; asgn (s).
We have the following instantiations of the axioms:
〈vs, set(mem, n, vn)〉→ [c(0)] 〈0 · vs, set(mem, n, vn)〉 Aint
〈0 · vs, set(mem, n, vn)〉→ [asgn(s)] 〈vs, set(set(mem, n, vn), s, 0)〉 Aasgn
〈vs, set(set(mem, n, vn), s, 0)〉→ [c(0)] 〈0 · vs, set(set(mem, n, vn), s, 0)〉 Aint
〈0 · vs, set(set(mem, n, vn〉 , s, 0))
→ [asgn(i)] 〈vs, set(set(set(mem, n, vn), s, 0), i, 0)〉 Aasgn
And by applying the Rule of Composition we obtain:
(1) 〈vs, set(mem, n, vn〉)
→ [c(0); asgn (s); c(0); asgn (i)] 〈vs, set(set(set(mem, n, vn), s, 0), i, 0)〉
We now want to apply the Rule of Iteration. First let us handle the condition.
Similarly to the “stepping” sequence above, we can use instances of (A++),
(Aid), (Aleq), and the Rule of Composition to chain them to obtain:
〈vs, set(set(set(mem, n, vn), s, 0), i, 0)〉
→ [c(Body)] 〈(1 ≤ vn) · vs, set(set(set(mem, s, 0), i, 1), n, vn)〉
Let x = vi, B = vi ≤ vn, vs = vs, mem = set(set(set(mem, s, (vi − 1) ∗
vi/2), i, vi), n, vn), P = @true(vi ≤ vn + 1). For xinit = 1 we have that
B[1/vi] = 1 ≤ vn, mem [1/vi] = set(set(set(mem, s, (1 − 1) ∗ 1/2), i, 1), n, vn),
P [1/vi] = @true(1 ≤ vn+ 1). Using that (1 − 1) ∗ 1/2↔ 0 and 1 ≤ vn+ 1 we
obtain
(2) 〈vs, set(set(set(mem, n, vn), s, 0), i, 0)〉→ [c(Cnd)](〈B · vs ,mem〉 ∧ P )[1/vi]
Now, we can again use instances of (Aid), (Aid), (Aplus), (Aasgn), (AMem),
(A++), (AId), (Aleq), and the Rule of Composition to derive
〈vs, set(set(set(mem, i, vi), n, vn), s, (vi− 1) ∗ vi/2)〉→ [c(Body); c(Cnd)]
〈(vi + 1 ≤ vn) · vs, set(set(set(mem, s, vi ∗ (vi + 1)/2, i, vi+ 1), n, vn)〉
By applying equivalences between formulas on naturals, the above leads to
〈vs, set(set(set(mem, i, vi), n, vn), s, (vi− 1) ∗ vi/2)〉
→ [c(Body); c(Cnd)] 〈B · vs,mem〉 [vi+ 1/vi]
Using Proposition 3.23 (i2) and the fact that vi ≤ vn ↔ vi + 1 ≤ vn + 1, we
obtain
(3)〈B · vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@true(B)
→ [c(Body); c(Cnd)](〈B · vs,mem〉 ∧ P )[vi+ 1/vi]
Now using the Rule of Iteration with (2) and (3) we derive that
〈vs, set(set(set(mem, n, vn), s, 0), i, 0)〉
→ [c(while Cnd do Body)]∃vi. 〈B · vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@false(B)
By arithmetic reasoning, ⊢ (false → vi ≤ vn) ↔ (true → vn + 1 ≤ vi),
hence ⊢ @false(vi ≤ vn) ↔ @true(vn + 1 ≤ vi). Moreover, @true(vn + 1 ≤
vi)∧@true(vi ≤ vn+1)↔ @true(vn+1 ≤ vi∧vi ≤ vn+1) which by arithmetic
reasoning is equivalent to @true(vi =Nat vn + 1), which by (I1) is equivalent
to vi ↔ vn + 1 which allows us to substitute vi by vn + 1 and eliminate the
quantification, leading to
∃vi. 〈vs,mem〉 ∧ P ∧@false(B)↔ 〈vs,mem〉 [vn+ 1/vi], hence,
(4) 〈vs,mem′〉→ [c(while Cnd do Body)] 〈vs,mem′′〉
where mem′′ = set(set(set(mem, s, vn ∗ (vn+ 1)/2), i, vn+ 1), n, vn),
mem′ = set(set(set(mem, n, vn), s, 0), i, 0).
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Using the Rule of Composition on (1) and (4) we obtain our goal.
5 Conclusions and related work
We defined a general many-sorted hybrid polyadic modal logic that is sound and
complete with respect to the usual modal semantics. From a theoretical point
of view, we introduced nominal constants and we restricted the application
of the satisfaction operators to nominals alone. We proved that the system
is sound and complete and we also investigated the completeness of its pure
axiomatic expansions. Given a concrete language with a concrete SMC-inspired
operational semantics, we showed how to define a corresponding (sound and
complete) logical system and we also proved (rather general) results that allow
us to perform Hoare-style verification. Our approach was to define the weakest
system that allows us to reach our goals.
There is an abundance of research literature on hybrid modal logic, we refer
to [1] for a comprehensive overview. Our work was mostly inspired by [3, 5, 11,
12], where a variety of hybrid modal logics are studied in a mono-sorted setting.
We need to make a comment on our system’s expressivity: the strongest hybrid
language employs both the existential binder and satisfaction operator for state
variables (i.e. @x with x ∈ SVAR). Our systems seems to be weaker, but the
exact relation will be analyzed elsewhere.
Concerning hybrid modal systems in many-sorted setting, we refer to [7,
9]. The system from [7] is built upon differential dynamic logic, while the
one from [9] is equationally developed, does not have nominals and satisfaction
operators, the strong completeness being obtained in the presence of a stronger
operator called definedness (which is the modal global operator). Note that,
when the satisfaction operator is defined on state variables, the global modality
is definable in the presence of the universal binder. However, we only have the
satisfaction operator defined on nominals, so, again, our system seems to be
weaker.
There are many problems to be addressed in the future, both from theo-
retical and practical point of view. We should definitely analyze the standard
translation and clarify the issues concerning expressivity; we should study the
Fischer-Ladner closure and analyze completeness w.r.t. standard models from
the point of view of dynamic logic; of course we should analyze more practical
examples and even employ automatic techniques.
To conclude, the analysis of hybrid modal logic in a many-sorted setting
leads us to a general system, that is theoretically solid and practically flexible
enough for our purpose. We were able to specify a programming language,
to define its operational semantics and to perform Hoare-style verification, all
within the same deductive system. Modal logic proved to be, once more, the
right framework and in the future we hope to take full advantage of its massive
development.
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